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I'm reasonably sure that I am the only living American who's
actually read all these [public records], all the way through.... [A
coworker] ... proposed an analogy between the public
records.., and the giant solid-gold Buddhas that flanked certain
temples in ancient Khmer. These priceless statues, never guarded
or secured, were safe from theft not despite but because of their
value-they were too huge and heavy to move. Something about
this sustained me.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2011, President Obama penned his name onto the
America Invents Act (AIA),2 and, in doing so, dramatically reshaped the patent
landscape post-grant. The AIA was the most significant reform to the patent
system in almost sixty years.3 Among the many changes wrought by the AIA,
the Act replaces inter partes reexaminaion with inter partes review and adds an
optional post-grant review for a time after a patent issues. 4 When these changes
went live September 16, 2012, inventors and practitioners had to quickly (and
hopefully adroitly) navigate the many post-grant options they were suddenly
confronted with. These options include ex parte reexamination, inter partes
review, post-grant review, supplemental examination, reissue, derivation
proceedings, and litigation.5
Many of these options are used before, concurrently, or after one another,
creating a diverse and nuanced plethora of permutations. 6 This complex
procedural web leaves the individual inventor or small business at a disadvantage
when enforcing his patent rights or when defending against asserted patents.
This Article investigates post-grant and inter partes review procedures and
offers evidence to suggest that, on average, small entities have been
disadvantaged by these procedures. 7
1 DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, THE PALE KING 84 n.25 (2012).
2 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
3 Andrei Iancu & Ben Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 476, 476 (2011).
4 America Invents Act § 60.
SId.
6 For example, a third-party requester can request ex parte reexamination at any time during the
enforceability of a patent-regardless of other concurrent proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
7 As used throughout this Article, a "small entity" is defined as an individual, a nonprofit, or a
corporation with fewer than 500 employees, in line with the definitions found in 37 C.F.R. § 1.27
(2005) and 17 C.F.R. § 121.802 (2013).
[Vol. 21:33
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/3
UNRAVELING THE USPTO'S TANGLED WEB
First, the new post-issuance regime increased complexity and the cost of the
review process-two factors that disproportionately affect small entities.
Second, the new post-issuance regime has so far been used as an essential
component rather than an alternative to litigation. Instead of significantly
reducing litigation costs or staving off endless trials, small entities involved in
litigation will now likely incur additional costs at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).
Third, small entities may bear a disproportionate burden in managing the
new regime and its costs. 8 This may further discourage small entities from
using the important post-issuance regime, or even from using the patent system
as a whole. Thus, the PTO and Congress would be wise to mitigate the
negative impact on small entities and rethink the statutory and regulatory
approaches to the post-issuance regime.
We recommend that the PTO and Congress strengthen post-grant review
procedures so they are true alternatives to litigation. This Article argues for the
use mandatory stay provisions, reduced estoppel, and uncoupled timing
deadlines. Only then will post-grant review procedures truly reflect, embody,
and effect congressional intent.
II. ESSENTIAL SMALL ENTITIES, EXPLAINED
Recent economic research shows that small businesses are the primary
driver of job creation in the United States.9 But, disturbingly, America's small
businesses have recently generated fewer jobs than expected based on historical
trends.1 0 Even so, a Small Business Administration report contends that firms
in emerging industries will define America's industrial future."
The patent system may be the key to securing America's future in
innovation. "For innovators in the American economy, patent protection is
often necessary to prevent copying and help in attracting investor capital,
thereby allowing these companies to make the necessary investments to grow,
build market share, and create jobs."'12 Small firms are a significant source of
innovation and patenting, developing more patents per employee than larger
8 See infra Part IV.B.
9 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL PATENT PROTECTIONS FOR SMALL
BUSINESSES 4 (2012) ("[Young startup companies, which are by their nature small businesses,
create an average of 3 million jobs per year, far more than their larger counterparts.'.
10 I.
11 ANTHONY BREITZMAN & DIANA HICKS, SMALL Bus. ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF SMALL
BUSINESS PATENTS BY INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE 1 (2008).
12 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 4.
2013]
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businesses and patenting more significant inventions.13 Patenting by small
businesses is concentrated in "high technology"'14 areas and is generally
associated with superior economic performance.' 5 Yet the share of patents
which small-entities hold continues to fall.16
III. THE IMPETUS FOR THE REEXAMINATION REGIME
The preexisting reexamination regime consisted of two disparate
proceedings: ex parte and inter partes reexaminations (reexams).17 Each shares
the same general origin and purpose.' 8
To appreciate the AIA's effects on the patent system, it helps to understand
the pre-AIA reexamination regime, its challenges, and what Congress sought to
address. First, consider the major reasons Congress created inter partes and
post-grant review proceedings: speed, certainty, and efficiency.19
In any patent examination system, imperfection inheres.20 After an inventor
submits a patent application to the PTO, the patent examination process
purports to have examiners search through all available prior art and apply all
legal requirements quickly, accurately, exhaustively, and adroitiy.21 However, in
reality, patent examiners have far too little time (often just eighteen hours-and,
13 BREITZMAN & HICKS, supra note 11, at 19-27 (using emerging clusters methodology based
on patent citations to identify significant patents).
14 Alicia Robb & E.J. Reedy, An Overview of the Kauffman Firm Survy: Results from 2009 Business
Aciities, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.kauffman.org/-/medin/
Kauffmanorg/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2011/03/efs_2009_overview_33111 .pdf.
15 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 7-8.
16 Shane Scott, Patents Granted to SmallEnfiies in Decine, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS (uly 19, 2010),
http://smallbiztrends.com/2010/07/how-smart-is-the-average-entrepreneur.html (showing a
decline of 300/6 in 1995 to 20% in 2009). But see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9,
at 7 ("Of the patent applications filed at the Agency between 2007 and 2010, about 30% paid small
entity filing fees ... .
17 MPEP § 2201 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) ("Statutory basis for citation of prior art patents or
printed publications in patent files and reexamination of patents became available on July 1, 1981,
as a result of new sections 301-307 of title 35 United States Code which were added by Public
Law 96-517 enacted on December 12, 1980 .... On November 29, 1999, Public Law 106-113
was enacted, and expanded reexamination by providing an 'interpartes' option. Public Law 106-
113 authorized the extension of reexamination proceedings via an optional inter partes
reexamination procedure in addition to the present exparte reexamination. 35 U.S.C. 311-318 are
directed to the optional interpartes reexamination procedures.").
18 We will discuss the differences between these proceedings in Part V.
19 As compared to the pre-AIA reexamination regime.
20 As former examiners, the Authors both have first-hand knowledge of the myriad
imperfections that complicate current office procedures.
21 Seegeneral/ 35 U.S.C. § 301-307 (2013).
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in many cases, less) or resources to always accurately assess patentability.22 If
examiners knew everything and had less stringent deadlines, it is responsible to
assume that at least some issued patents would be rejected.23
As scholars note, "excessive numbers of low-quality patents can prevent
healthy rates of innovation. '24 The question then is: what can we do to build a
better system? Giving examiners more time could cost billions, according to
one estimate, 25 and would surely exacerbate the PTO's already substantial
backlog. Too much examining time could bring the PTO patent prosecution
process to a grinding halt, as the rate of applications received greatly exceeds
the disposal rate, even with the current truncated timeline.
Conversely, patent litigators often invalidate, by clear and convincing
evidence, patents that should never have issued. Parties can bring charges of
invalidity as a defense to infringement suits or as a basis for declaratory judgment
actions. 26 Despite various acknowledged accountability gaps in the patent
examination system, only 1.5% of all patents end up being litigated.27 Professor
Mark Lemley argues that this imperfect system of initial review is in fact optimal,
because additional resources are more efficiently allocated to those few patents
that are issued and later disputed.28 Indeed, scholar John Allison posits that these
litigated patents account for a significant portion of the valuable patents anyway.29
Congress has long recognized imperfections in the examination system and the
need to occasionally reexamine some issued patents that are important to their
owners.30 This reexamination regime originally had two main objectives: to
bolster the validity of patents and to provide an alternative to litigation. 31
22 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1500 (2001)
(discussing the lack of resources available to PTO patent examiners).
23 Id
24 Kevin R. Davidson, Retooling Patents: Current Problems, Proposed Solutions, and Economic
Implications for Patent Reform, 8 HOus. Bus. & TAX L.J. 425, 442 (2008).
25 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1508-11.
26 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1999).
27 Lemley, supra note 22, at 1507.
28 Id. at 1497.
29 John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437 (2004).
30 See Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, Not a
Supplement, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 177, 181-88 (2009).
31 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION 2 (1980), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/oia/reports/
reexamreport.pdf ("Exparte reexamination of patents, and the procedures for [the] same, were
established by Congress to serve as an expedited, low-cost alternative to patent litigation for
reviewing only certain aspects of patent validity, based on patents and printed publications."
(citing Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3016, § 1 (1980))).
2013]
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A. REASON ONE: TO BOLSTER THE VALIDITY OF PATENTS
For most of the long history of the PTO, the agency had no authority to
cancel an issued patent.32 It took almost two hundred years for Congress to
eventually give the PTO the power to reexamine patents.33  Ex parte
reexamination was designed in part to permit patentees to lend support to the
patent's validity in case prior art suffered after examination.34 As some have
urged, "[m]ore narrowly tailored patents will enjoy heightened respect from
competitors because such patents are much harder to invalidate. ' 35 In addition to
prior art discovery, post-issuance modifications to relevant legal precedent may
also impact patentability and give cause to reaffirm patent rights, such as in the
arena of 35 U.S.C. 5 101 patentable subject matter.3 6 Some argue the Supreme
Court decisions, such as KSR v. Telefex,37 and even Federal Circuit decisions, such
as the Ace Corp. Int'l v. CLS Bank Cop.38 case, cast serious doubt on the validity
of many hundreds of thousands of issued patents.39 Reexamination offers patent
owners a limited opportunity to revisit validity in light of recent case law.
32 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608 (1898) ("It has been
settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has received the signature of the
secretary of the interior, countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the
seal of the patent office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office... .
33 See Paugh, supra note 30, at 181-88 (recounting the history of examination producers).
34 See H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 45 (2011) (showing congressional intent behind enacting ex
parte re-examination).
35 Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: Recent Trends,
Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 382 (2009).
36 See, e.g., CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. (CLS Bank 1/), 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cit. 2013) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Alice Corp. Pry. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l (CLS Bank V1), No. 13-298 (U.S. Dec. 6,
2013). Patent applicants may generally appeal adverse decisions of examiners to the PTO's Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI, now the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB)), from
there to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) directly or to the Eastern District of
Virginia and then to the CAFC, and from the CFC to the United States Supreme Court on a petition
for certiorari. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (a for new post-grant review proceedings and exparte appeals
from examination decisions, appeal may be taken directly to the Federal Circuit). See 35 U.S.C. § 145
(appeal to the Eastern District of Virginia); 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2012) (appeal from ex parte
reexamination); Rule 10, Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court (rule for certiorari petitions). Similarly,
parties who receive adverse litigation decisions from a federal court may appeal to the CAFC and
from there to the Supreme Court. 35 U.S.C. § 1295 (2013). Reversals at any level may affect the
certainty of patentability determinations of any decisionmaker below.
37 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
38 717 F.3d 2169 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
39 Robert Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with Concurrent District Court Patent Litigation,
9 SEDONA CONF.J. 53, 53 (2008) (referring to the change to the CAFC's approach to obviousness
in KSR v. Tekflex). The PTO actually refers to KSR as a "clarification" that "does not alter the
legal standard for determining whether a substantial new question of patentability exists." MPEP,
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In addition to patentee requests, third parties may challenge the validity of a
patent.40 Third parties often do so when threatened with an infringement suit.4'
Third-party requesters represent' the bulk of reexamination requesters. 42
Reexamination thus provides "a less costly way of removing or restricting
patents that should not have been granted or that were granted too broadly, to
permit such challenge even before litigation-inducing controversy has
arisen .... ,,43 "Reexamination would eliminate or simplify a significant amount
of patent litigation. In some cases, the PTO would conclude as a result of
reexamination that a patent should not have issued. A certain amount of
litigation over validity and infringement thus would be completely avoided." 44
Challenges to patents increase the certainty of validity of those patents that
survive the reexamination process, improve the credibility of the patent system
as a whole and, in theory, reduce the incidence of contentious litigation.
B. REASON TWO: TO PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE TO LTIGATION
The initial ex parte reexamination process was also created as an alternative
to litigation. Congress stated in 1980 that:
Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about
the validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and
lengthy infringement litigation.... The reexamination of issued
patents could be conducted with a fraction of the time and cost
supra note 17, § 2216. The Supreme Court's recent trend of modifying CAFC precedent has
continued with cases like Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) and Mqyo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). Reexamination, however, does not entertain
questions pertaining to patent eligibility at issue in these cases.
40 See 35 U.S.C. § 302 ("Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination . .
41 See MATTHEW A. SMITH, Inter Partes Reexamination (1st ed., Jan. 31, 2009), availabk at http://
www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/InterPartesReexamination.pdf ("An examination
of the first two hundred inter partes reexaminations conducted by the author shows that over one
hundred were directed to patents involved in co-pending litigation.").
42 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Ex PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA -
SEPTEMBER 30, 2011, at 5 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/exparte histo
ricalstats_tol_up.E0Y2013.pdf (third party requests represent 66% of all ex parte requests).
Inter partes requests can only be filed by third parties or ordered by the Commissioner of Patents.
See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2008) ("Any third-party requester at any time may file a request for inter
pares reexamination by the Office of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the
provisions of section 301."), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 6, 125 Stat. 284, 285-92 (2011).
43 In re Const. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting).
44 See Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S. 1679 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 15-16 (1979) (statement of Comm'r U.S. Patent and Trademark office, Sidney Diamond).
2013]
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of formal legal proceedings and would help restore confidence in
the effectiveness of our patent system.... It is anticipated that
these measures provide a useful and necessary alternative for
challengers and for patent owners to test the validity of United
States patents in an efficient and relatively inexpensive manner.45
In particular, reexamination was thought to "be of great benefit to small
businesses for defending their patents." 46 Likewise, one senator pointed to the
reduced burden placed on small businesses and independent inventors.47 In
1982, Congress initially created only ex parte reexamination, which includes the
PTO and the patentee. 48 But Congressmen purportedly came to believe that
greater involvement of a third-party requester in the reexamination process
would allow for a cheaper expedited means of resolving patent disputes.49
Some critics of ex parte reexamination argued that the procedure was too
limited because of the minimal involvement of third parties. After the initial
request, the PTO allowed a third-party requester a maximum of one written
response. Thus, third parties had little involvement or control and the
controversy generally continued apace.5 0
In response to a general desire for a better patent litigation alternative,
Congress created inter partes reexamination in 1999.51 Inter partes involved
both parties in the dispute and a large number of prior art challenges, although
parties were initially shy about utilizing inter partes reexaminations, 2 since the
lack of page limits had led to the practice of petitions that were hundreds
(perhaps thousands) of pages long.5 3
45 H.R REP. No. 96-1307, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462-63.
46 126 CONG. REc. 29,901 (1980) (statement of Rep. Harold Hollenbeck).
47 126 CONG. REc. 30,364 (1980) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
48 35 U.S.C. § 302-05 (2012).
49 126 CONG. Rc. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
50 See S. 1070, 141 CONG. REc. S10655-S10659 (1995) (enacted) ("Many critics of our system
argue the existing reexamination process offers only an illusory remedy for inventors because of
the limits imposed on these third parties and similarly, the issues that can be considered in
reexamination.").
51 Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-571 (1999).
52 See infra FIGURE 3.
53 General Administrative Trial Final Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 48612, 48620 (Aug. 14, 2012) ("In the
early 1990s, page limits were not routinely used for motions, and the practice suffered from
lengthy and unacceptable delays.").
[Vol. 21:33
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IV. THE IMPETUS FOR THE POST-ISSUANCE REGIME OF THE AMERICA
INVENTS ACT
A. CONGRESS'S REASONING
In the early years of inter partes reexamination, parties filed few such cases,
and the movement to reform the nascent procedure quickly gained traction.5 4
The inter partes reexamination process, in particular, was initially underutilized.
Only twenty-seven total requests were filed in the first four years, when 600
requests have been projected during that time.55  Thus, Congressional
representatives had plenty of fodder for floor statements addressing their
perceived flaws of the old system:
The object of the patent law today must remain true to the
constitutional command, but its form needs to change, both to
correct flaws in the system that have become unbearable, and to
accommodate changes in the economy and the litigation practices
in the patent realm. The need to update our patent laws has been
meticulously documented in [fifteen] hearings before the
Committee or its Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, as well as eight hearings before the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. In addition, these
legislative findings are augmented by the Federal Trade
Commission and the National Academy of Sciences, both of
which published authoritative reports on patent reform, and a
plethora of academic commentary.5 6
More recently, Congress declared that the AIA "is designed to establish a more
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and
limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs."57 "Patents of dubious
probity only invite legal challenges that divert money and other resources from
54 See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 6 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); FED. TRADE
COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAw AND POLICY 33 (2003).
55 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 46 (2011).
56 Id. at 38-39 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 40.
2013]
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more productive purposes, purposes such as raising venture capital,
commercializing inventions and creating jobs."5 8
Congress expressed concern that the reexamination length had grown
excessive.59 The director of the PTO in 2005 pointed to cases lasting several
years and their associated costs as evidence that the reexamination process was
not working.60 Despite the fact that the PTO should treat reexamination
proceedings with "special dispatch," the director testified that "a large number
of reexamination proceedings have been pending before the USPTO for more
than four years without resolution." 61 In addition, Congress recognized that the
appeal system also added to the overall length of the process. 62
Congress also sought to balance the role of patent owners and third-party
requesters. Some argued that reexamination does not provide a viable
alternative to litigation because "these procedures do not provide third parties
with a fair and balanced degree of participation." 63 Thus, the new inter partes
and post-grant review proceedings are intended to expand and balance the role
of both parties in a fashion similar to litigation.
Congress pointed to a few motivating factors not addressed by the legislation.
First, Congress seemed concerned that, at the time, a third-party requester had no
right to appeal a final PTO decision.64 While the PTO eventually changed the
rules regarding reexamination to permit the appeal of final decisions, an initial
determination of whether to institute inter partes review or post-grant review is
still not appealable. 65  Second, Congress was concerned with "inconsistent
damage awards." 66 However, damages are not addressed by the AIA, presumably
because the issue was too contentious for bipartisan agreement. Third, Congress
identified limitations of reexamination such as the fact that requests cannot be
based on prior public use or prior sales.67  The AIA does not expand
58 Patent Quak'o Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The
Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Juditiau, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop.).
59 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 45.
60 Testimony of Mr. Jon Dudas, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Apr. 25, 2005), http://
www.ididary.senate.gov/heatings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862fr7 35dal0 4 aa60 &hit-it=
e655f9e2809e5476862f735da104an60-1-1.
61 Id.
62 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 45.
63 Patent ,Qualiy Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The
Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judidaty, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of
Jeffery P. Kushan).
64 HR. REP. No. 112-98, at 45.
65 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e) (2012) (reflecting changed reexamination rules).
66 H.R. REP. No. 119-98, at 40.
67 Id. at 45.
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reexamination to permit such a basis of request. Fourth, Congress referred to a
recent trend of Supreme Court cases reversing rulings of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC).68 As discussed below, the issues raised by these cases
are largely not addressed by the AIA.
Congress created the CAFC in part to harmonize U.S. patent law and handle
all appeals for patent cases. 69 Reversals by the CAFC can send significant
ripples throughout the pond of patent law. As noted in Section III.A supra,
reversals in precedent raise questions of the validity of vast numbers of issued
patents. Congress referred to six such recent reversals that "reflect[ed] a
growing sense that that questionable patents are too easily obtained and are too
difficult to challenge." 7° Interestingly, neither the post-issuance regime nor the
AIA in general impact most of the cases referenced. The six are:
(1) Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) ("reversing the
Federal Circuit and holding that the machine-or-
transformation test is not the sole test for determining the
patent eligibility of a process");
(2) Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)
("reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that patent
exhaustion applies to method patents when the essential or
inventive feature of the invention is embodied in the
product");
(3) Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Coro., 550 U.S. 437 (2007)
("reversing the Federal Circuit and limiting the
extraterritorial reach of section 271(f), which imposes
liability on a party which supplies from the U.S. components
of a patented invention for combination outside the U.S.');
(4) KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. (KSR), 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
("reversing the Federal Circuit and strengthening the
standard for determining when an invention is obvious
under section 103");
(5) Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)
("reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that the threat of
a private enforcement action is sufficient to confirm
standing under the Constitution');
68 Id at 39.
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(6) eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
("reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that the generally
applicable four-factor test for injunctive relief applies to
disputes in patent cases).7
Of these six cases, only KSR (which dealt with obviousness) directly applied to
the old reexamination regime, as reexamination permitted questions of validity
based only on issues of novelty and obviousness. 7 2 However, even that
decision had little bearing on the reexamination process, for the reasons
articulated below.
Did KSR fundamentally alter the examination or reexamination regime? The
PTO itself refers to KSR as a mere "clarification" that did "not alter the legal
standard for determining whether a substantial new question of patentability
exists." 73 (Sound familiar? The PTO has written a memo indicating the same
thing about the recent CLS Bank decision.7 4) Hence, post-KSR, a reexamination
requester could not base a request solely on the possibility that the examiners
misapplied pre-KSR standards. As a result, despite the disturbing trend of
Supreme Court reversals of Federal Circuit decisions, the switch to inter partes
review will not actually have much effect on the issues at the heart of these cases.
Importantly, in Bilski (a § 101 subject-matter inquiry), the CAFC was not
reversed, even though the Supreme Court did not rely on the well-regarded
machine-or-transformation test of the CAFC.7s Nonetheless, Congress addressed
the future post-issuance questions of patent eligibility in Bilsk. Though inter
partes review-expected to be the majority of post-issuance proceedings-does
not extend to such questions, the new post-grant review (PGR) proceeding and
the new transitional covered business method patent (CBM) proceeding open the
door to review questions of eligibility, utility, enablement, written description, and
indefiniteness. However, parties can only file a request shortly after a patent
issues (for PGR) or under very specific circumstances (for CBM). 76 Congress-
apparently unwilling to expand the range of grounds for challenges to the entire
71 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, at 93 n.7.
72 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303, 311; see also 37 C.F.R. 1.552 (2013); MPEP § 2258 (8th rev. 2008).
73 MPEP, supra note 17, § 2216.
74 Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirschfeld, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination
Policy, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (May 13, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/c/slant_21030J13.pdf.
75 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010).
76 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.202(a) (post-grant review time for filing), and §§ 32.303, 42.300
(transitional covered business method post-grant review time for filing and other requirements).
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life of potentially problematic patents-greatly limited the possibility of
addressing the precedential changes it had in mind.
B. THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE REEXAMINATION REGIME: AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
1. Cost of Liti"galion. Patent litigation is expensive, even compared to general
litigation.7 7 Total average costs range from $916,000 to just over $6 million.
Generally, the cost of litigation rises dramatically with the amount in
controversy.78  Notably, the preliminary stages of litigation contribute
substantially to overall cost.79 The period through discovery accounts for over
5 0%  of overall cost.80  Yet even regardless of the amount in controversy,
litigation costs often prevent patentees from enforcing their rights and can
disadvantage alleged infringers by denying them an opportunity for a proper





4 E IAI1 Inclusive-7-
2 m End of Discovery
0
0
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Amount in Dispute (Millions)
FIGURE 1: THE COSTS OF LITIGA ION
2. Who Owns it'gated Patents? Who litigates? In light of the preceding
evidence, readers probably expect that small entities represent the minority of
77 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AsSOCIATION (AIPLA), AIPLA REPORT OF THE
ECONONC SURvEY 2011, at 1-153 to 1-154 (2011); see infra FIGURE 1.





Consilvio and Stroud: Unraveling the USPTO's Tangled Web: An Empirical Analysis of the
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2013
f. INTELL. PROP. L
patent litigantsl-albeit to their great advantage. One might rationally presume
small entities have less capital available to absorb litigation expenses and would,
therefore, be less likely to litigate. Indeed, small businesses are often cash-
constrained, which limits their ability to obtain patent protection.82
Not so. According to one influential study, while less than one-third of all
non-litigated patents were issued to small entities, two-thirds of litigated patents
belonged to small entities.8 3
Non-Litigated Patents
Litigated Patents
FIGURE 2: LITIGATED AND NON-LITIGATED PATENTS, COMPARED
81 Allison et al., supra note 29, at 435.
82 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9, at 19.
83 Allison et al., supra note 29, at 466.
[Vol. 21:33
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/3
UNRAVELING THE USPTO 'S TANGLED WEB
The trend continues. Reexamination costs have averaged $128,000 through
the close of prosecution,84 far lower than for litigation. One can expect IPR,
PGR, and CBM proceedings, while far more expensive and (at least in the
short-term) time-consuming, to be similarly cost-effective (in relation to
litigation). Yet given the fact that fewer small entities have instituted inter
partes review, as shown infra, and given the above trend between litigated and
non-litigated patents, cost alone does not appear to dictate the choice of forum.
One frequent theory behind this imbalance posits that small and large
entities have asymmetric stakes in litigation.85 Small entities may have more to
gain or less to lose, two factors that may encourage litigation.
Further, because large entities can have vast patent portfolios, and because
the scope of patent coverage may be difficult to ascertain, large entities may
seek to cross-license rather than litigate. Conversely, small entities, likely having
relatively few patents, may not be similarly situated, and thus may seek an all-or-
nothing approach, or take advantage of the leverage associated with litigation
defense costs. Additionally, there is some evidence that small entities make
more significant innovations8 6 and may, therefore, be more likely to find
conflicts with potential competitors.
3. The Link Between Reexamination and Utt'gation. In spite of patent litigation's
substantial costs, data from the PTO shows that reexamination-especially
inter partes reexamination-is used primarily as an additional supplement to
litigation.8 7 If a patentee were settling disputes solely through the reexamination
process and settlement, one would expect very few of those patents to be
involved in litigation. Likewise, because a substantial number of patents are
cancelled through the inter partes reexamination process, one would expect
there to be less patents available to provide a basis for bringing a suit. But, in
fact, about 70% of inter partes reexamination requests are related to litigation.88
So far, roughly 800/o-90% of IPRs have related litigation 8 9 -so the changes
appear to accelerate the trend, rather than counteract it.
84 AIPLA, supra note 77, at 1-173.
85 Allison et al., supra note 29, at 435.
86 BREITZMAN & HIcKS, supra note 11, at 21.
87 See Paugh, supra note 30, at 181-88 (arguing that Congress never intended reexamination to
supplement litigation).
88 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA -
SEPTEMBER 30,2011, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stop/inter-parte-his
t orical+stats+rollupEOY2013.pdf; infra FIGURE 3.
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FIGURE 3: INTER PARTES, EX PARTES REEXAMS AND LITIGATION
The link between ex parte reexamination and litigation is lower (33%)90 then
for inter partes reexamination. This is to be expected, since a third of ex parte
requesters are patent owners. Obviously, patent owners cannot file suits against
themselves. While a patent owner can file an ex parte reexamination request
while simultaneously involved in an infringement suit, presumably many
requests are made preemptively-possibly short-circuiting any potential
dispute.91 It should be noted that the numbers of related litigation cases listed
in those references are "minimums" according to "known" data. One can
reasonably assume that even for inter partes requests, some requests predate
future litigation or act, effectively, as declaratory judgment actions-preemptive
strikes to known or anticipated pending litigation disputes. Therefore, the
correlation is likely to be even higher than those numbers reported to the PTO.
90 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 42, at 5.
91 Thus, the low number-330/o---is deceptive because some unknowable number of
"prevented" litigations never come to pass and are therefore not counted.
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4. Reexamination Filing Data. Yet, things always change. Since 2004, the
reexaminations request trend tells a different story (see FIGURE 4
"Reexamination Filing Data," below).92 Reexamination is now considered the
leading mechanism for challenging patent validity in the United States.93 Like
ex parte reexamination requests, inter partes reexamination requests have been
on the rise. 94 Although it is difficult to identify with any certainty the factors
driving the increase in requests, it can be reasonably assumed that requesters
have become more familiar with the procedure. Similarly, as more inter partes
reexaminations come to completion, the surrounding substance and procedure
should become more predictable.
Reexamination Filing Data
a a Ex Parte
Reexam







FIGURE 4: PTO FILING INFORMATION FOR REEXAMINATIONS
Inter partes reviews, however, have not been so slow to start, as public
USPTO statistics show. As of shortly after the eighteen-month anniversary of
92 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 42, at 5; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFHCE, supra note 88, at 3.
93 Gardella & Berger, supra note 35, at 381.
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the new proceedings, nearly, 1,000 petitions had been filed in the first year-and-
a-half alone.95
Small entities historically make up about one-third of all inter partes
requesters. 96 The data pool is too small to draw firm statistical conclusions
from this evidence. The numbers do, however, raise some interesting
questions: How many small entities have been drawn into inter partes
reexamination by large entity requesters? What percentage of reexamination
proceedings are involved in related litigation? Answers to these questions
would paint a clearer picture of the role of small entities in the reexamination
regime.
It is important to note that small entities may be comprised, in part, of non-
practicing entities (NPEs). NPEs are entities that own patents, but do not
produce or manufacture any products. It is difficult to assess the role of NPEs
in this area. Limited available data allows only limited inferences about NPEs.97
Some studies, however, have indicated that NPEs account for a small
percentage of litigation, and when they do litigate, they fare poorly.98 Notably,
the non-joinder provisions of the AIA are likely to skew any future statistics-
for instance, if one stay issues in twelve co-pending litigations in a single district
with a single NPE plaintiff, the numbers may over-represent NPE presence and
influence. Nonetheless, arguments against the perceived abuses of NPEs have
clearly influenced legislative poicymakers. 99
5. Reexamination Pendengy. The average inter partes reexamination runs about
thirty-six months 00 The average ex parte reexamination pendency comes in at
approximately 25.6 months.10 1 By comparison, proceedings outside the PTO are
generally far less time-consuming, particularly if one takes into account the
circumstances. Section 337 investigations at the International Trade Commission
95 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Progress (2013), available at http://www.uspto.
gov/ip/boards/bpai/state/032014 aia stat-graph.pdf.96 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings-Post-Grant Review Proceedings,
and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680, 78711
(Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
97 Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-MakersAn EmpiricalAnaysis of Nonpraieing Entities, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 114, 117 (2010) ("An empirical analysis of patent and litigation data cannot
provide a definitive answer about the benefits and drawbacks of NPEs, but it can serve as a
helpful starting point for policymakers weighing the arguments made by opposing sides of the
NPE debate.").
98 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quako and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litgants, 99 GEO. L.J.
677passim (2011).
99 Id.100 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 88, at 3.
101 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 42, at 6.
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typically range from fifteen to eighteen months.10 2 Infringement litigation in
district court usually takes between two and three years. 013  These latter
proceedings are full-blown trials that cover a much larger breadth of issues than
the prior art patentability determination of reexamination. Additionally, so-called"rocket dockets" have increased the speed of resolution in some district courts.
The District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Texas are famous for their
large and disproportionate number of patent suits that attract litigants seeking fast
judicial review.10 4
6. Abusive Challenges. The standard for initiating reexamination permits too
many challenges. The data bears this out. The current standard results in 95%
of all requests being granted. 05  This sham petitioning could be used
strategically to pull some defendants into costly and protracted disputes. A
small but visible number of abusive requests may have a disproportionate
impact on perception. Almost 90% of reexaminations amend or cancel the
claims.' 06 If a request had suspect merits, it seems unlikely that requesters
would have had such a high rate of success. Presumably, at least the majority of
the requests filed were bona fide questions of patentability and not simply
abusive ones.
V. AIA REFORMS TO THE POST-ISSUANCE REGIME
Words which he did not understand he said over and over to
himself till he had learnt them by heart: and through them he had
glimpses of the real world about them. The hour when he too
would take part in the life of that world seemed drawing near and
in secret he began to make ready for the great part which he felt
awaited him the nature of which he only dimly apprehended. 107
102 MARK LYON & SARAH PIYMEIER, PRACTICAL LAW Co., ITC SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS:
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLMAMS 3 (2011), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publicatio
ns/Documents/LyonPiepmeier-ITCSecion337Investigations.pdf (referring to data for the
Northern District of California).
103 Id.
104 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 'STATES COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTION: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 162-75 tbl.C-7, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistical/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness20l .aspx.
105 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, spra note 88, at 3.
106 Id
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Dubbed "a patent system for the 21st century," the new patent regime
enacted a host of changes very welcome to the savvy patent practitioner. The
AIA implements myriad new procedural and substantive rules. It switches from
a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, bringing invention priority
treatment in line with virtually every other country.108 The AIA abolishes inter
partes reexamination in favor of inter partes review and expands post-issuance
options to include a separate post-grant review proceeding to settle disputes
over a granted patent. 109 It also creates the transitional program for covered
business method patents (CBMs). nl 0 However, ex parte reexamination remains
almost exactly the same."'
A. INTER PARTES REVIEW
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR IP REEXAMINATION IP REVIEW
DIFFERENCES
CONDUCTED BY CENTRAL REEXAMINATION UNIT PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BOARD
DISCOVERY No "LIMITED"
CROSS-EXAMINATION No YES
TIME TO COMPLETION "SPECIAL DISPATCH" 12 MONTHS[AVERAGE 36.2 MONTHS] [6 MONTH EXTENSION]
THRESHOLD SUBSTANTIAL NEW QUESTION REASONABLE IAKELIHOOD TO
PREVAIL.
FIGURE 5: INTER PARTES REVIEW AND REEXAMINATION, COMPARED
108 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285-93 (2011).
How these other changes will affect small entities is beyond the scope of this Article.
109 Id. § 6, 125 Stat. at 299-313.
110 Id. 18, 125 Stat. at 329-30.
111 The advent of "Supplemental Reexamination" may have changed the proceeding somewhat,
but that is also beyond the scope of this Article. For more information, see 35 U.S.C.
% 257(c)(2)(A), (B) (2012).
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1. From Examinaion to Administralive Trials. Reexamination is an examination
proceeding before the PTO whereby an examiner reopens a case file and
reexamines an issued patent in light of new evidence relevant to the patent's
validity." 2 A specialized Central Reexamination Unit (CRU) handles requests
from patent owners or third parties and conducts reexaminations. n 3 Current
and former reexamination proceedings are conducted on paper.' 4
Inter partes review itself limits third-party involvement. First, the procedure
does not permit discovery."5 As a result, litigation may be the only way to
obtain important evidence. Second, the procedure does not permit cross-
examination." 6 Cross-examination may be particularly important in disputing
expert witness affiants. Third, there is no opportunity for the examiner to
interview either party." 7 This drawback may cause the examiner to err on a
point that could otherwise be clarified by a simple phone call.
The most substantial modification to the inter partes procedure is that inter
partes review replaces the paper administrative procedure of reexamination with
a mini-trial conducted by a panel of three administrative patent judges-
complete with discovery and depositions." 8 The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI) has been renamed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) and will be responsible for handling the inter partes review." 9 These
new proceedings balance the power between patent owners and third parties,
whether they are small or large entities.
The proceedings, however, may have several additional advantages for large
entities. First, in addition to the fee increase, discovery could be a significant
financial burden to small entities. As noted in Section IV.B. 1, the cost of
litigation from initiation through discovery is a significant percentage of the
overall cost of the litigation itself. Technical expert declarants and the need for
skilled legal representation could also add to the overall cost. Though the
PTAB can admit attorneys pro hac vice, the PTAB generally requires attorneys to
112 Gardella & Berger, supra note 35, at 382.
113 Id. at 391-92. The Commissioner of Patents can also order reexamination sua sponte.
114 Id.
115 See MPEP § 2616 (Rev. 7, 2008) ("Congress has not provided the Office with subpoena
power or discovery tools and has not provided the Office with the ability to conduct hearings for
eliciting testimony and cross-examination."); see also Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing reexamination procedures).
116 See Gardella & Berger, supra note 35 (discussing inter partes review procedures).
117 Id.
118 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6-7, 125 Star. 284, 299-315 (2011).
119 Id. § 7, 125 Stat. at 313-15.
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be admitted to the patent bar.120 As a result, a party involved in concurrent
litigation may need to hire additional representation solely for the inter partes
review proceeding.
2. Time to Completion. The AIA requires that the final determination be
issued no later than one year post-institution.'2' The PTAB may extend the
timeframe by six months for good cause.1 22 In addition to the statutory time
limits, the switch from the CRU to the PTAB also eliminates a step in the
appeals process. The new statutory scheme also has a safety valve, should the
PTAB receive more cases than they can timely handle: the PTAB need not
institute a review-even if the request is legally sufficient to institute a review-
for the first four years inter partes reviews are in effect, if the number of cases
equals or exceeds the number of inter partes reexamination requests in the last
year of their availability.123
The AIA gives the director of the PTO explicit authority to limit the
number of reviews in the first four years of implementation.124 In addition to
this authority, there is an out. Unlike the old inter partes reexamination statute,
which required the director to institute a proceeding if the threshold was met, the
inter partes review statute permits the Director to institute a proceeding if the
threshold is met.125 Therefore, if the number of requests for review exceeds an
acceptable number, the director has the authority to simply refuse additional
requests.
The new inter partes review time frame has greatly sped up proceedings
compared to inter partes reexamination. 126 This increased speed to final
disposition should attract small and large entities alike. And foreign entities
with familiarity with other patent systems may feel more comfortable than U.S.
parties when using these proceedings. 27
120 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(c) ("The Board may recognize counselpro bac ice during a proceeding
upon a showing of good cause, subject to the condition that lead counsel be a registered
practitioner and to any other conditions as the Board may impose.").
121 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6, 125 Stat. at 302.
12 Id.
123 Id. § 6(c)(B), 125 Stat. at 304.
124 Id.
12 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ('The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted
unless ...." (emphasis added)).
126 Id.
127 Dale L. Carlson & Robert A. Migliorini, Past as Prologue for Patent Reform: E4evience in Japan
wtb Oppositions Suggests an Alternative Approach for the U.S., 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
101, 109 (2006) (discussing Japan's "Trial for Invalidity").
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3. Threshold. Requests for reexamination involve prior patents or printed
publications that present a "substantial new question of patentability.1 28
Congress has expanded the definition of "new" to include new arguments
based on "old" art, i.e., art that was applied or cited during the initial
prosecution of the patent:
It must first be demonstrated that a patent or printed publication
that is relied upon in a proposed rejection presents a new, non-
cumulative technological teaching that was not previously
considered and discussed on the record during the prosecution of
the application that resulted in the patent for which
reexamination is requested, and during the prosecution of any
other prior proceeding involving the patent for which
reexamination is requested .... After the enactment of the
Patent and Trademark Office Authorization Act of 2002 ("the
2002 Act'), a substantial new question of patentability can be
raised by patents and printed publications "previously cited by or
to the Office or considered by the Office" ("old art") .... The
revision permits raising a substantial new question of
patentability based solely on old art, but only if the old art is"presented/viewed in a new light, or in a different way, as
compared with its use in the earlier concluded examination(s), in
view of a material new argument or interpretation presented in
the request."'1 29
The AlA expands the body of challengeable patents,130 but raises the bar for
granting a request. For inter partes review, the requester must demonstrate a"reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
[one] of the claims challenged in the petition.' 131 The new threshold raises
many questions. For example, what is the relationship between the
reexamination threshold and the review threshold? Also, does the new standard
128 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2014).
129 MPEP, supra note 17, § 2216.
130 The current system precludes reexamination of patents filed before Nov. 1, 1999. See MPEP
2611 (rev. 7, 2008) ("An inter partes reexamination can be filed for a patent issued from an
original application filed on or after November 29, 1999. For a patent which issued from an
original application filed prior to November 29, 1999, the statutory inter partes reexamination
option is not available, only the ex parte reexamination is available.").
131 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2014).
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allow parties to make the same arguments they articulated during examination?
During reexamination?
The answer appears to be yes to each of these questions. There is no
requirement that the grounds be "new." Indeed, § 325(d) indicates the PTO
Director "may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request
because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously
were presented to the office."'132 The Board also "may take into account" to"not require the Director, in deciding whether to institute [JPR], to defer to a
prior determination in the Patent and Trademark Office, even one which
considered the same prior art and argument."' 133
If grounds are not required to be "new," the change in threshold may back-
fire in practice. This threshold was intended to prevent abusive challenges, but
it has opened the door to revisiting rejections applied during examination. 34
Such an opening makes it easy in some instances to simply rely on an
examiner's rejection that may meet the new "reasonable likelihood" threshold-
perhaps bolstered by expert testing and a litigator's resources. 135
In many instances, that is what parties have done. 136 And it is not only art
and grounds that the Board may reconsider, apparently-in K-40 Electronics,
LLC v. Escort, Inc., the Board reviewed a 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 declaration (swearing
to prior invention by the applicant), held it defective, and reapplied the prior art
the declaration had antedated, instituting the IPR.137 And in Polaris Wireless, Inc.
v. TruePosiion, Inc., the Board effectively overruled the examiner's reasoning that"one of ordinary skill would not combine" references teaching certain things. 138
Uncertainty may cause small parties to hesitate to use the review process.
Denials are not appealable and are, therefore, unlikely to generate precedent
that would quickly clear ambiguity in this area.139 Fortunately, the estoppel
provisions do not attach based solely on a petition for review, or a denial
132 Id. § 325(d).
133 Nexans Inc. v. Belden, Inc., IPR2013-00057, Paper 11, at 14 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2013) (ID)
(Decision on Institution).
134 See Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., IPR2013-00043, Paper 14 (May 13, 2013) (ID) (and
nine other related IPRs 00044-53). There, the Board instituted based on inherency arguments on
art the examiner had previously considered. This is only one example of many early IPRs that
have been instituted on art and arguments considered by the examiner and overcome during
prosecution.
135 Contrast the "reasonable likelihood" threshold with the "more likely than not" standard,
discussed infra.
136 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
137 IPR2013-00203, Paper 8 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2013) (ID) (Decision on Institution).
138 IPR2013-00323, Paper 9, at 24 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2013) (ID) (Decision on Institution).
139 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012).
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thereof' 40 The PTAB must issue a "final written decision" for the estoppel
provisions to apply.'4'
Such uncertainty is likely most beneficial to the litigation team with the most
resources, technical ability, and experience. In general, this could be
disadvantageous for small entities.
4. Other Notable Changes (Estoppel, Amendment).42 The AIA also expands the
permitted use of estoppel to subsequent proceedings in front of the PTO and
precludes anyone who has filed for declaratory judgment on invalidity or has been
served with a complaint of infringement more than a year prior from requesting
review. 143 This estoppel provision, coupled with the PTO's discretion to stay,
transfer, consolidate, or terminate additional concurrent proceedings before the
PTO, may complicate litigation strategy.'" These provisions appear to be
intended to curb abusive use of the post-issuance regime that extends over
multiple proceedings. The proceedings probably do not favor either small or
large entities, though they do add some uncertainty to the process and, as we have
established, uncertainty generally favors the larger party.
Surprising to some, the Board denied nearly all Motions to Amend in inter
partes reviews in the proceedings' first eighteen months, causing many parties
to question the propriety of the broadest reasonable interpretations standard
(which is at least in part premised on the opportunity to amend).145 The Board
has indicated a desire to educate the bar about Amendment practice-noting
that parties must respond not only to the grounds of unpatentability involved in
the trial, 146 but must also distinguish between all known art, "anywhere, in
whatever setting";147 that they must show 35 U.S.C. § 112 written description
1- Id. § 315(e).
141 Id.
142 We do not discuss the broadest reasonable claim interpretation (BRI) in this Article, as
reexamination also applied BRI.
143 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012).
144 Id. § 315(d).
145 See, e.g., THE COALITION FOR 21ST CENTURY PATENT REFORM, WHY THE PTO's PROPOSED
USE OF THE BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF PATENT CLAIMS IN POST-GRANT AND
INTER PARTES REVIEWS Is INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT (2014), available at
http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/Why-thePTOs-Proposed Useof BRIis-inappr
opriatejl9July2012.pdf ("The use of BRI in PGR and IPR is inappropriate because a major
premise for allowing the PTO to use BRI-that patent owners will not be harmed because there
is a sufficient opportunity for patent owners to amend their claims as needed in response to
adverse PTO rulings on patentability-is lacking in PGR and IPR.').
146 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121(a)(2), 42.221(a)(2)(i) (2013).
147 Toyota Motor Corp. v. Am. Vehicular Scis. LLC, IPR 2013-00419, Paper 32, at 4 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 7, 2014) ("It should be revealed whether the feature was previously known anywhere, in
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support and construe the claims; 148 that they can only narrow claims; and that
they can only cancel a challenged claim or propose a reasonable number of
substitute claims. 149 The patent owner has the burden of proof,150 and in fifteen
pages, they face difficulty in getting even one amended claim approved. 151
5. THINGS LEFT UNCHANGED.
NOTABLE SIMILARITIES IP REEXAM IP REVIEW
Requester Non-patentee Non-patentee
Issues raised or could have been Issues raised or could have beenEstoppel raised raised
Patents and other printed Patents and other printedBasis of Challenge publications publications
Scope of Challenge 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 35 U.S.C. § 102, 103
FIGURE 6: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IPR AND REEXAMINATION
With all of the substantial changes to the post-issuance regime, it is
fortunate that some things remain the same. The requester of the review will
still need to identify all real parties in interest, adding transparency to the
process. 152 Also, estoppel still applies to all issues that were raised or could
have been raised.153 However, the AIA balances estoppel in both avenues, i.e.,
it applies to both proceedings in district court and in other proceedings in front
whatever setting, and whether or not the feature was known in combination with any of the other
elements in the claim.").
148 See id. at 5 (requiring a showing of compliance with the written description requirement).
149 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121 (a) (3), 42.221 (a) (3) (2013).
150 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) (2013).
151 Note that the Motion is not an "amendment" per se, but rather are proposed substitute
claims-claims that won't be further examined, but will go directly to issue if granted. Note also
that further discussion on motions to amend is beyond the scope of this Article.
152 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, at 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012); see also In
re Guan, Inter Partes Reexamination Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,045 (Aug. 25, 2008)
(Trolbusters').
153 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
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of the PTO.154 Again, it is unclear how all of this will affect parties in review,
though it may again discourage the use of this mechanism. .
B. POST-GRANT REVIEW 55
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR POST-GRANT REVIEW IP REVIEW
DIFFERENCES
AT LEAST NINE MONTHS AFTER ISSUE
OR
AFTER POST-GRANT REVIEW
WINDOW TO FILE UP TO NINE MONTHS AFTER ISSUE ANAND
No MORE THAN ONE YEAR AFTER
INFRINGEMENT COMPLAINT
SCOPE OF CHALLENGE 35 U.S.C. § 101,102,103,112 35 U.S.C. § 102,103
THRESHOLD MORE LIKELY THAN NOT REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD TO PREVAIL
FIGURE 7: POST-GRANT REVIEW, COMPARED
Post-grant review can be viewed as a variation on or as an older sibling to
inter partes review. The two proceedings are similar in most respects, but have
a few notable differences. For example, a requester must petition for post-grant
review within a limited window post-grant. 15 6 This puts substantial pressure on
stakeholders to quickly review issued patents in their fields. This shortened
period favors those who have the means and experience to know where to look
and what to look for. Small entities less familiar with the patent landscape will
be disadvantaged by this time limit compared to savvier large entities.
For a post-grant review, the petitioner must demonstrate that it is more
likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged is unpatentable. 157
Additionally, for a post-grant review, the petitioner may'base a request on a
154 Compare id. § 315(e)(1) ("[Piroceedings before the Office."), with id. § 315(e)(2) ("[qivil
actions and other proceedings.').
155 A notable feature of post-grant review is the "Transitional Post-Grant Review of Business
Methods" proceeding. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284,
329-31 (2011). This proceeding has several additional exceptions and rules that apply to only
business method patents. Little data exists in this area and is beyond the scope of this Article.
156 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2013).
157 Id. § 324(a).
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novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent
applications. 158
Comparing the two standards, the "reasonable likelihood"
standard is lower than the "more likely than not" standard. The
reasonable likelihood standard allows for the exercise of discretion
but encompasses a 50/50 chance whereas the more likely than not
standard requires greater than a 50% chance of prevailing.
Petitioners are encouraged to clearly set forth the best ground
of unpatentability as to each challenged claim[] [sic] to facilitate
early resolution of the issues. In instituting an IPR or PGR, the
Board may take into account whether the same or substantially
same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the
Office. Additionally, the Board may also go forward on
challenged claims that are unpatentable based on obviousness
where challenge is based on anticipation 5 9
The differences in these thresholds add to the uncertainty in the process, which
will likely disadvantage small entities.
Parties can also bring challenges over 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 112, rather than
only on §§ 102 and 103, and are not limited to patents or printed
publications. 160
C. TRANSITIONAL COVERED BUSINESS METHODS POST-GRANT REVIEW
The transitional program for covered business method patents post-grant
review is a special type of post-grant review that can only be filed more than
nine months post-issuance, but only in certain circumstances and only for
certain patents. A discussion of that provision is beyond the scope of this
Article.161
158 Id. § 324(b).
159 Message from Chief Judge James Donald Smith, Board of Patent Appeals and Inte frrences: USPTO
Discusses Key Aspects of New Administrative Patent Trials, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/aiajimplementation/smith-blog-extravaganza.jsp#heading-l (internal
citations omitted).
1- See 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
161 P. Andrew Riely, Jonathan R.K. Stroud & Jeffrey Totten, The Surpising Breadth of Post-Grant
Review for Covered-Business-Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent Claims, 15 CoLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 235, 235 (2014).
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D. OVERALL EFFECT ON SMALL ENTITIES
Though Congress made some changes that even the solo petitioner will
appreciate, the AIA has stratified an already convoluted and complex patent
landscape. The new system mirrors the complexity of the technology it seeks to
manage, and unfortunately, the data and assumptions based on the available
evidence are disheartening for small entities.
Notably, a study on small businesses required by the AIA will be available
after the post-issuance regime takes effect.162 Hopefully, it will paint a more
attractive picture than that sketched here. In the meantime, this Article
attempts to analyze the regime's effect on small entities. We argue that several
conservative changes to the impending regime will help mitigate the negative
effects of the post-issuance regime on small entities.
VI. EARLY EVIDENCE: ANALYZING THE FIRST EIGHT AND THE FIRST
EIGHTEEN MONTHS
When it is said that we are too much occupied with the means of
living to live, I answer that the chief worth of civilization is just
that it makes the means of living more complex; that it calls for
great and combined intellectual efforts, instead of simple,
uncoordinated ones .... Because more complex and intense
intellectual efforts mean a fuller and richer life. They mean more
life. Life is an end in itself, and the only question as to whether it
is worth living is whether you have enough of it.163
So far, roughly 80% to 90% of all IPRs filed have copending litigation at the
time of filing-a number that may actually be higher in light of possible
declaratory judgment actions filed on behalf of patent owners. 164 The number
(and all statistics) may deceive, however, so we explain our methodology. 165
162 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 ("Small business
study") (2011).
163 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Speech at a dinner given by the Bar Association of Boston, Mass.,
Mar. 7, 1900, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 79-80 (U. Chi. Press, Chicago, II., Richard A.
Posner ed., 1992).
164 Statistics in this section compiled from public documents; on file with author.
165 The old adage "Lies, damned lies, and statistics" seems an appropriate warning. See MARK
TWAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1906).
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A. SOME WORDS CONCERNING METHODOLOGY
Although there have been over 950 IPRs filed as of March 16, 2013,166 there
are far fewer discrete "groups" of IPRs-285, by our count, although counting
methodology varies. We call them "groups" because these sets of IPRs are all
derived from the same litigation or controversy, 67 so to get an accurate count
of the percentage of cases stayed, the districts represented, and other numbers,
we found it more appropriate to measure using copending litigations as a
yardstick. Note also that identifying which liigations are related to the same
general dispute is difficult after the AIA's non-joinder provisions, 168 and in the
age of multi-district litigation, counts and statistics in this area tend to vary
wildly. Note too that our count includes discrete sets of cases where there was
no copending litigation identified with the petitions-so controlling for those
numbers, there were 285 relevant copending litigations. 169 But tracking the stay
motions quickly became unwieldy (and has been replaced by commercially
available, machine-tracked data). So we provide stay data for the first eight
months below, and then provide case analysis and other statistical analysis of
the early decisions.
166 The actual number is 957. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AIA PROFESS (2013),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/032014-aia-stat_graph.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2013).
167 For instance, one particularly egregious example is the Clouding IP v. Oracle litigation, which
has more than sixteen related IPR filings. See Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR 2013-
00073 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 8, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00075
(P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 10, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088 (P.T.A.B.
filed Dec. 17, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00089 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec.
17, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00090 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 18, 2012);
Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00091 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 18, 2012); Oracle
Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00094 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 21, 2012); Oracle Corp. v.
Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00095 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 21, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding
IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00098 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 21, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC,
No. IPR2013-00099 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 21, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No.
IPR2013-00100 (P.T.A.B. filed Dec. 21, 2012); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-
00260 (P.T.A.B. terminated July 22, 2013); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-
00261 (P.T.A.B. terminated July 22, 2013); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-
00271 (P.T.A.B. filed May 7, 2013); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00273
(P.T.A.B. filed May 8, 2013); Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00275 (P.T.A.B.
filed May 9, 2013); Clouding IP, LLC v. Oracle Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00642 (D. Del. dismissed July
12, 2013).
168 See 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (AIA non-joinder provisions).
169 Personally compiled statistics.
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B. STATISTICS SO FAR--GENERALLY (FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS)
Luckily, the AIA required the USPTO to publish statistics relevant to patent
owners, °70 and they have done so publicly on their website, even going so far as
to provide graphical representations of the data. 71 (That data speaks for itself,
and at any rate will change weekly and remain public.)
We do, however, provide the following chart of popular forums for
copending litigations, which reveals (perhaps unsurprisingly) that the Eastern
District of Texas, the Central District of California, and the District of
Delaware are the three most popular patent forums.
Popular Forums for Co-pending Litigations
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
E.D. Tex. 145-- - ' " 69C.D. Cal. i 42 ,
30D. Del 18-,,,,,,,,,, i17
M.D. Fla. - 1513N.D.N.Y. - 13
-w 12S.D.N.Y. 12
-12E.D. Mich. 1l-== 1 }
E.D. Pa. 10:10.
D. Mass. 9 
-9D.Minn. 8 
-8E.D. Wis. - 7-7S.D. Ind. - 7
-7D. Colo. 66D. Nev. - 6
-6S.D.Ohio 65D. Me. 5
FIGURE 8: POPULAR FORUMS FOR CO-PENDING LITIGATIONS
170 35 U.S.C. § 319(d) ("DATA ON LENGTH OF REVIEW.-The Office shall make
available to the public data describing the length of time between the institution of, and the
issuance of a final written decision under subsection (a), for each inter partes review.").
171 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AIA PROGRESS (2013), available at http://www.
uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/032014-aiastat-graph.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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FIGURE 9: NUMBER OF RELATED LITIGATIONS, BY DISTRICT
FIGURE 9 shows that in the early days of IPR, the District of Delaware
received the most requests for a stay, and likewise those cases influenced the
growth of district court case law associated with stays. It is notable that of
those eleven discrete groups of litigation in Delaware listed, most have multiple
litigations (likely as a result of the AIA non-joinder provisions).172 So those
eleven litigation groups have or could result, statistically, in the stay of over fifty
172 See, e.g., the Beacon group of legislation and the Pi-Net group of litigation: Beacon
Navigation GMBH v. Chrysler Group LLC, D. Del. Nos. 1:11-cv-00922-GMS, -cv-00924-GMS, -
cv-00927-GMS, -cv-00929-GMS, -cv-00931-GMS, -cv-00933-GMS, -cv-00935-GMS, -cv-00937-
GMS, -cv-00940-GMS, -cv-00942-GMS, -cv-00944-GMS, -cv-00946-GMS, -cv-00948-GMS, -cv-
00952-GMS, -cv-00954-GMS, -cv-00956-GMS, -cv-00958-GMS and cv-00960-GMS; Pi-Net
International, Inc. v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc. (No. 1:12-cv-00355); Bank of America, N.A.
and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (No. 1:12-cv-00280); JP Morgan Chase & Co.
(No. 1:12-cv-00282); Capital One Financial Corporation et al. (No. 1:12-cv-00356); Sovereign
Bank, N.A. (No. 1:12-cv-00354); UBS Financial Services (No. 1:12-cv-00353); Wilmington Trust
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copending litigations. (In these groups of litigation, district courts generally
select a "lead case" and file one set of papers for most major orders, motions,
and responses.)
Petitioners in those first eight months, on average, challenged 15.5 claims;
thirty-four actions were instituted on all of the claims challenged; and the Board
took an average of around 153 days to decide whether to institute.173
C. EARLY IPR DENIALS (THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS)
Of the first fifty-four cases instituted (not counting any nonmeritorious
outliers), five petitions were denied on the merits. Those cases are:
" Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.174
• Denso Corp. v. Beacon Navigation GmbH 175
" WowZa Media Systems, LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc.176
" Monsanto Co. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Monsanto )177
" Monsanto Co. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Monsanto I178
All followed a patent owner's response.
In Synopsys, the PTAB construed an important claim narrowly, using the
patent owner's reasoning to avoid a prior art reference. Notably, the
administrative patent judge (APJ) criticized the petition for not "clearly
point[ing] to where each element of the claim is found" in the reference and for
not "clearly explain[ing] the reasoning" behind petitioner's invalidity
arguments. 179
In Denso, the petitioner failed to construe the claims. The PTAB, relying on
its version of the "ordinary and customary meaning for all claim terms,"
provided a specific construction for one important claim term. 8° The APJs
used their own construction to show that the petitioner's arguments failed for
each reference asserted.181
173 Personally compiled statistics.
174 IPR2012-00041 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 22, 2013).
175 IPR2013-00027 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2013).
176 IPR2013-00054 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2013).
177 IPR2013-00022 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2013).
178 IPR2013-00023 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2013).
179 Synopys, at 17-18.
180 Denso, at 8.
181 Id. at 8-28.
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In WowZa, the APJs rejected a number of § 103 challenges. The Board panel
rejected the petitioner's proposed construction of a term and instead ruled that
the claims should not be so construed.' 82
In the Monsanto cases, the petition was deficient because it failed to explain
why the person having ordinary skill in the art would find the claims inherent in
the prior art. Notably, an expert declaration was given "little weight" for failing
to "provide sufficient underlying data."'183 Thus the PTAB exercised its
newfound discretion to discredit an expert's sworn affidavit. 184
D. EXAMPLES OF EARLY INFLUENTIAL STAY DECISIONS (FIRST EIGHT
MONTHS)
In Everh'ght Electrnics Co. v. Nichia Corp., a Michigan federal judge denied a
stay, holding that "a stay would be unreasonably prejudicial to the [p]laintiffs in
light of the procedural posture of this action," as the case was in the late stages
of litigation. 85
Conversely, in Star Envirotech, Inc. v. Redline Detection, LLC, a Central District
of California judge held that, "in light of the above considerations and the
liberal policy of granting motions to stay litigation pending the outcome of
USPTO proceedings, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Stay Pending
Inter Partes Review."l8 6
Amusingly, a judge in the Middle District of Florida used some colorful
language while issuing an order granting a stay. In Captiola Corp. v. LaRose
Industries, LLC, the judge wrote:
Once again commercial interests clash over the scope of a patent.
In this instance, the patent claims a child's toy, apparently an
enchanting and successful toy. The defendants ask to defer the
litigation pending an interpartes review by the PTO under a recent
amendment to the patent statute. The plaintiffs request "full
speed ahead" in the litigation. Because the litigation, although in
the incipient stage, promises an abundance of venom and the
attendant delay and expense in all events; because the PTO
apparently will not consume much time unless the PTO perceives
an important patent issue within the PTO's particular expertise;
182 Wowza, at 5-7 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2013).
183 Monsanto I, at 5-7 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2013).
184 Id at 6-8; Monsanto II, at 7-8.
185 No. 12-cv-11758, 2013 WL 1821512, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2013).
186 No. SACV 12-01861 JGB (MLGx), 2013 WL 1716068, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2013).
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and because an important issue that appears in the litigation also
appears to fall within the PTO's province and particular expertise,
prudence commends resort to a stay until either the PTO. declines
review or, finding an important issue within the PTO's special
province, the PTO grants and completes review to the benefit of
the parties, the court, and the public. In other words, the
investment of some time at this juncture appears wise.187
Another Central District of California court, in Semiconductor Enegv Laboratory
Co. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., granted a stay, in part "because SEL does not dispute
that it has not sought a preliminary injunction and that SEL and CMI are not
direct competitors. '"188
E. SMALL ENTITIES: BENEFIT OR DETRIMENT? (FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS)
Another early surprise has been the Board's denial of grounds as"redundant." 189 While a full discussion of those denials is beyond the scope of
this paper, here are five notable denials based on redundant grounds (where there
were requests for rehearing involved, which required an explanation of those
grounds): Berk-Tek, LLC v. Belden Techs., Inc., IPR2013-00057, Paper 21 (Mar. 14,
2013); LaRose Indus., LLC v. Capriola Corp., IPR2013-00120, Paper 20 (July 22,
2013); Microstrategy, Inc. v. Zillow, Inc., IPR2013-00034, Paper 23 (Apr. 22, 2103);
Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, IPR2013-00088, Paper 13 (June 13, 2013);
ScentAir Techs., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00180, Paper 18 (Aug. 26, 2013).
F. SMALL ENTITIES: BENEFIT OR DETRIMENT? (FIRST EIGHT MONTHS)
By our count, as of May 16, 2013, roughly 56% of filers have been large
entities, 28% have been medium-sized entities, and only 16% have been small
entities.1 90 For ten months thereafter, the trend continued, with large entities
filing IPRs in significant number.191  Yet, this is certainly a significant
percentage-particularly when controlling for the large number of copending
IPRs large entities in associated litigation generally file. However, given that
187 No. 8:12-cv-2346-7-23TBM, 2013 WL 1868344, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2013).
188 No. SACV 12-21 -JST (JPRX), 2012 WL 7170593, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012).
189 FMC Corp. and VMWare, Inc. v. Personal Web Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00082, Paper 33, at 4
(P.T.A.B. June 5, 2013) (stating that counseling parties should "articulate a meaningful distinction
in terms of relative strengths and weaknesses with respect to application of the prior art
disclosures to one or more claim limitations" to avoid horizontal and vertical redundancy).
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IPRs should provide an alternative to litigation, and small entities represent the
majority of litigators, the numbers so far are perplexing and show that small
entities have not yet taken full advantage of the complicated procedures.
VII. PROPOSALS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT ON SMALL ENTITIES
A. STUDY
A review of the current evidence regarding the role of small businesses in
the patent system suggests that the government and stakeholders should
dedicate further study to this area. The PTO records assignees, but not
necessarily companies; therefore, determination of patent ownership is of
critical importance. 92 Even though small entities average about one-third of all
inter partes requests, the PTO seems to downplay the impact of the AIA on
small entities by referring to the miniscule percentage (0.05%) of patents in
force that are owned by small entities.193 Such a perspective undermines the
true effect on small entities and the inter partes review procedure itself. When
the total number of inter partes reexamination requests is compared to the total
number of patents in force, it too is a miniscule amount.
The underutilization of the inter partes reexamination procedure is a major
reason for the changes made by Congress. As discussed above, Congress
sought to increase the utilization of an inter partes procedure for the benefit
small entities in particular. Therefore, the PTO should make a special effort to
ensure that inter partes review is accessible to small entities.
B. FEES
Treating everyone equally does not necessarily mean treating everyone fairly.
Many find flat taxes unfair because they disproportionately burden the least
wealthy. 194 Likewise, flat fees charged by the PTO for inter partes review and
192 BREITZMAN & HICKS, supra note 11, at 3 ("Patents owned by General Motors and others are
a mixture of names of firms, establishments, subsidiaries, and variants of firm names. Mergers
and acquisitions are also constantly changing the status of firms. As an example, large firms like
General Motors and Procter & Gamble patent under more than 100 names. Extreme cases of
firms that have a history of mergers, such as Glaxo-SmithKline, will have patents under more
than 300 names.").
193 Id.
194 See Report, FALLING FLAT: THE DuBIous CASE FOR THE FLAT TAX, ECONOMIC POLICY
INSTITUTE; John Irons, Cutting Taxes for the Rich Never Ends Well, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
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post-grant review may disproportionately burden small businesses and
individual inventors. It should be noted that being a "small business" or
"individual inventor" does not necessarily equate to less overall wealth. 195
Nevertheless, the PTO has given small entities a 50% discount on virtually all
fees in obtaining a patent. 96 The AIA has expanded this discount to even
smaller businesses and individuals, dubbed "micro entities."' 197 Oddly, though,
these discounts do not extend to reexamination fees. The PTO should reduce
fees for small and micro entities for IPRs and PGRs and take into account the
economic impact on those entities in deciding whether to expand discovery. 198
C. OMBUDSMAN
Recognizing the need to assist small entities in obtaining a patent, Congress
mandated an ombudsman program.199 The ombudsmen would act as liaisons
with the PTO to help small entities through the examination process. 200 These
same reasons exist to help small entities navigate the post-issuance processes.
Such support can mitigate some of the harm resulting from the new complexity
created by the AIA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The AIA has not had Congress's intended effect. First, recent data shows
that inter partes requests generally have a strong correlation with litigation. In
actuality, however, this correlation should be stronger because the data does not
necessarily include all potential related litigation-only that which has been
accurately self-reported. Since a suit may be filed after a request for inter partes
proceeding, a suit filed after the request was filed might not be included.
Therefore, one would expect the correlation to increase if the life of a patent is
taken into account. Accordingly, like inter partes reexamination, stakeholders
195 See Scott Shane, How Much Mongy do Small Business Owners Make?, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS
(Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.smaUbiztrends.com/2010/11/how-much-money-do-small-busines
s-owners-make.html (discussing the portion of aggregate household income attributable to small
business owners in the United States).
196 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012).
197 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 254, 317 (2011)
(micro entities receive a 75% discount).
198 Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings-Post-Grant Review Proceedings,
and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680, 78711
(Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
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may not be using inter partes review as a true alternative to litigation. Instead,
the data supports the conclusion that, like inter partes reexamination, inter
partes review is used as an adjunct to litigation.
Second, although the AIA eliminates the possibility of appealing to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interference and its corresponding costs, the fee
increase for inter partes review and the cost of discovery may add a substantial
expense. If inter partes review is indeed a supplement to litigation, the increase
in cost may be prohibitive. Third, estoppel and procedural limitations may
remain a large deterrent to inter partes requests. Inter partes review may not be
a viable option to some involved in litigation and the risk of estoppel will likely
continue to worry practitioners. Lastly, the requirement to divulge the real
party in interest will likely discourage potential infringers from filing a valid
request that would identify that party to the patentee.
Many implications of the AIA are too difficult to predict for the average
practitioner. Many may have taken a wait-and-see perspective until the dust
settles. But inter partes review may attract others with hopes of quick
resolution. Even for those already involved in concurrent litigation, review
concluded well before trial. Though we should not underestimate the attraction
to the speed of the procedure, every case will bring its own set of priorities and
concerns. While practitioners form strategies to handle the post-grant paradigm
shift, the average inventor may find himself or herself without a compass in
navigating this new complex landscape.
[Vol. 21:33
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